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Abstract1
We introduce the oak property of first order theories, which is a syntactical condition that we2
show to be sufficient for a theory not to have universal models in cardinality λ when certain cardinal3
arithmetic assumptions about λ implying the failure of GCH (and close to the failure of SCH) hold.4
We give two examples of theories that have the oak property and show that none of these examples5
satisfy SOP4, not even SOP3. This is related to the question of the connection of the property SOP46
to non-universality, as was raised by the earlier work of Shelah. One of our examples is the theory7
T ∗feq for which non-universality results similar to the ones we obtain are already known; hence we8
may view our results as an abstraction of the known results from a concrete theory to a class of9
theories.10
We show that no theory with the oak property is simple.11
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0. Introduction 1
Since the very early days of the mathematics of the infinite, the existence of a universal 2
object in a category has been the object of continued interest to specialists in various 3
disciplines of mathematics—even Cantor’s work on the uniqueness of the rational numbers 4
as the countable dense linear order with no endpoints is a result of this type. For some more 5
recent examples see for instance [1,5]. We approach this problem from the point of view 6
of model theory, more specifically, classification theory, and we concentrate on first order 7
theories. In [10] the idea was to consider properties that can serve as good dividing lines 8
between first order theories (in [10]; more general theories in other work). This is to be 9
taken in the sense that useful information can be obtained both from the assumption that 10
a theory satisfies the property, and the assumption that it does not, and in general we may 11
expect several equivalent definitions for such properties. Preferably, there is an “outside 12
property” and a “syntactical property” which end up being equivalent. The special outside 13
property which was central in [10] was the number of pairwise non-isomorphic models, and 14
it led to considering the notions of stability and superstability. It is natural to ask whether 15
other divisions can be obtained using problems of similar nature. This is a matter of much 16
investigation and some other properties have been looked at; see for example [6,21] and 17
more generally [20]. One such property is universality, which is the main topic of this paper. 18
In a series of papers, e.g. Kojman–Shelah [8] (see there also for earlier references), [9], 19
Kojman [7], Shelah [16,18], Džamonja–Shelah [3], the thesis claiming the connection 20
between the complexity of a theory and its amenability to the existence of universal models 21
has been pursued. Further research on the subject is in preparation in Shelah’s [23]. It 22
follows from the classical results in model theory (see [2]) that if GCH holds then every 23
countable first order theory admits a universal model in every uncountable cardinal, so the 24
question we need to ask is what happens when GCH fails. We may define the universality 25
number of a theory T at a given cardinal λ as the smallest size of the family of models of 26
T of size λ having the property that every model of T of size λ embeds into an element of 27
the family. Hence, if GCH holds this number for uncountable λ and countable T is always 28
at most 1. It is usually “easy” to force a situation in which such a universality number is 29
as large as possible, namely 2λ (by adding Cohen subsets, see [8]); however assuming that 30
GCH fails and allowing ourselves a vague use of the words “many” and “often” for the mo- 31
ment, we can distinguish between those theories which for many cardinals have the largest 32
possible universality number in that cardinal whenever GCH fails, and those for which it is 33
possible to construct a model of set theory in which GCH fails, yet our theory has a small 34
universality number at the cardinality under consideration. This division would suggest 35
that the latter theories—let us call them for the sake of this introduction amenable—are of 36
lower complexity than the former ones. The definition of amenability can be given in more 37
precise terms. In the view of the preceding discussion involving the universality behaviour 38
in models of GCH, it is not surprising that this definition is expressed in terms of forcing. 39
Definition 0.1. We say that a theory T is amenable iff whenever λ is an uncountable 40
cardinal larger than the size of T and satisfying λ<λ = λ and 2λ = λ+, while θ satisfies 41
cf(θ) > λ+, there is a λ+-cc (< λ)-closed forcing notion that forces 2λ to be θ and the 42
universality number univ(T, λ+) (see Definition 0.7) to be smaller than θ .
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Localising this definition at a particular λ we define what is meant by theories that are1
amenable at λ.2
Kojman and Shelah in [8] proved that the theory of a dense linear order exhibits high3
non-universality behaviour, making it a prototypical example of a non-amenable theory.4
That is, they proved (Section 3, proof of Theorem 3.10) that the theory of a dense linear5
order satisfies the property described in Definition 0.3, which we shall call high non-6
amenability. We shall indicate below that this name is well chosen, in the sense that high7
non-amenability implies the negation of amenability as introduced above. In order to define8
high non-amenability we shall need a somewhat technical definition of a tight (κ, µ, λ)9
club guessing sequence, but as this definition will be needed anyway in Section 2, we shall10
give the exact definition now rather than glancing over it for the sake of the introduction.11
Definition 0.2. (1) Suppose that κ < λ are regular cardinals and that κ ≤ µ < λ while S12
is a stationary subset of λ consisting of points of cofinality κ . A sequence 〈Cδ : δ ∈ S〉13
will be called a tight [truly tight] (κ, µ, λ) club guessing sequence iff14
(i) for every δ ∈ S the set Cδ is a subset of δ with otp(Cδ) = µ,15
(ii) for every club E of λ there is δ ∈ S such that Cδ ⊆ E , and16
(iii) for every α ∈ λ17
|{Cδ ∩ α : δ ∈ S & α ∈ (Cδ \ lim(Cδ))}| < λ.18
[In addition to (i)–(iii) above,19
(iv) sup(Cδ) = δ.]20
(2) Suppose that λ is a regular cardinal, µ < λ and 〈Cδ : δ ∈ S〉 satisfies (i)–(iii) from (1)21
with the possible exception of S not necessarily being a set of points of cofinality κ for any22
fixed κ . Then we say that 〈Cδ : δ ∈ S〉 is a tight (µ, λ) club guessing sequence.23
Definition 0.3. A theory T is said to be highly non-amenable iff for every large enough24
regular cardinal λ and κ < λ such that there is a truly tight (κ, κ, λ) club guessing sequence25
〈Cδ : δ ∈ S〉, the number univ(T, λ) is at least 2κ .26
Suppose that a theory T is both amenable and highly non-amenable, and let λ be a27
large enough regular cardinal while V = L or simply λ<λ = λ and ♦(Sλ+λ ) holds. Let28
P be the forcing exemplifying that T is amenable. Clearly there is a truly tight (λ, λ, λ+)29
club guessing sequence C¯ in V , and since the forcing P is λ+-cc, every club of λ+ in V P30
contains a club of λ+ in V ; hence C¯ continues to be a truly tight (λ, λ, λ+) club guessing31
sequence in V P . Then on the one hand we have that in V P , univ(T, λ+) ≥ 2λ by the high32
non-amenability, while univ(T, λ+) < 2λ by the choice of P , a contradiction.33
In fact [8] proves that any theory with the strict order property is highly non-amenable.34
On the other hand Shelah proved in [18] that all simple theories are amenable at all succes-35
sors of regular κ satisfying κ<κ = κ . In that same paper Shelah introduced a hierarchy of36
complexity for first order theories, and showed that high non-amenability appears as soon37
as a certain level on that hierarchy is passed. The details of this hierarchy are described38
in the following Definition 0.8, but for the moment let us just mention the fact that the39
hierarchy describes a sequence SOPn (3 ≤ n < ω) of properties of increasing strength40
such that the theory of a dense linear order possesses all the properties, while on the other
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hand no simple theory can have the weakest among them, SOP3. Shelah proved in [18] 1
that the property SOP4 of a theory T implies that T exhibits the same non-universality 2
results as the theory of a dense linear order; in other words it is highly non-amenable. In 3
the light of these results it might then be asked whether SOP4 is a characterisation of high 4
non-amenability, that is whether all highly non-amenable theories also have SOP4. 5
The results available in the literature do not provide a counter-example, and the ques- 6
tion in fact remains open after this investigation. However we provide a partial solution 7
by continuing a result of Shelah about the theory T ∗feq of infinitely many indexed inde- 8
pendent equivalence relations, [16]. It is proved there that this particular theory exhibits 9
a non-amenability behaviour provided that some cardinal arithmetic assumptions close to 10
the failure of the singular cardinal hypothesis SCH are satisfied (see Section 1 for details). 11
This does not necessarily imply high non-amenability, as it was proved also in [16] that this 12
theory is in fact amenable at any cardinal which is the successor of a cardinal κ satisfying 13
κ<κ = κ . Here we generalise the first of these two results by defining a property which im- 14
plies such non-amenability results and is possessed by T ∗feq. This property is called the oak 15
property, as its prototype is the model completion of Th(Mλ,κ, f,g), a theory connected to 16
that of the tree κ≥λ (for details see Example 1.3). The oak property cannot be made a part of 17
the SOPn hierarchy, as we exhibit a theory which has oak, and is NSOP3, while the model 18
completion of the theory of triangle-free graphs is an example of a SOP3 theory which does 19
not satisfy the oak property. On the other hand we prove at the end of Section 1 that no oak 20
theory is simple. We also exhibit a close connection between T ∗feq and Th(Mλ,κ, f,g). These 21
results indicate that in order to make the connection between the high non-amenability, 22
amenability and the SOPn hierarchy more exact one needs to consider the failure of SCH 23
as a separate case. In addition the oak property not being compatible with the SOPn hier- 24
archy gives new evidence that this hierarchy does not exhaust the unstable theories that do 25
not have the strict order property. Note that in [[18], 2.3(2)] there is an example of a first 26
order theory that satisfies the strong order property but not the strict order property (and 27
the strong order property implies all SOPn , though it is not implied by their conjunction). 28
To finish this introduction, let us summarise the connection between the cardinal arith- 29
metic and the universality number that is shown in this paper (a more detailed discussion of 30
this can be found at the end of Section 2). Firstly, by classical model theory, if GCH holds 31
then the universality number of any first order theory of size < λ, at any cardinal ≥ λ, is 32
1—hence the situation is trivialised. Similarly, the results that we have here on sufficient 33
conditions for non-amenability trivialise if the Strong Hypothesis StH of Shelah holds [15] 34
because the conditions are never satisfied. StH says that pp(µ) = µ+ for every singular µ; 35
hence cf([µ]<κ,⊆) ≤ µ+ for every κ < µ, so StH implies the Singular Cardinal Hypoth- 36
esis SCH (it is itself implied by ¬0). However, if StH fails, say κ, λ regulars satisfy that 37
for some singular µ we have cf(µ) = κ and µ+ < λ while pp(µ) > λ, for all we know 38
the results here hold and are not trivial, in the sense that not only do all known consistency 39
proofs of the failure of StH show this, but it is not known whether it is consistent to have 40
the failure of StH and at the same relevant cardinals a failure of our assumptions. 41
Let us now commence the mathematical part of the paper by giving some background 42
notions which will be used in the main sections of the paper, starting with some classical 43
definitions of model theory. 44
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Convention 0.4. A theory in this paper means a first order complete theory, unless1
otherwise stated. Such an object is usually denoted by T .2
Notation 0.5. (1) Given a theory T , we let C = CT stand for “the monster model”, i.e. a3
saturated enough model of T . As is usual, we assume without loss of generality that all our4
discussion takes place inside some such model, so all expressions to the extent “there is”,5
“exists” and “|=” are to be relativised to this model, all models are ≺ C, and all subsets of6
C that we mention have size less than the saturation number of C. We let κ¯ = κ¯(CT ) be the7
size of C, so this cardinal is larger than any other cardinal mentioned in connection with T .8
(2) For a formula ϕ(x¯; a¯) we let ϕ(C; a¯) be the set of all tuples b¯ such that ϕ[b¯; a¯] holds9
in C.10
Definition 0.6. (1) The tuple b¯ is defined by ϕ(x¯; a¯) if ϕ(C; a¯) = {b¯}. It is defined by the11
type p if b¯ is the unique tuple which realises p. It is definable over A if tp(b¯, A) defines it.12
(2) The formula ϕ(x¯; a¯) is algebraic if ϕ(C; a¯) is finite. The type p is algebraic if it is13
realised by finitely many tuples only. The tuple b¯ is algebraic over A if tp(b¯, A) is.14
(3) The definable closure of A is15
dcl(A) def= {b : b is definable over A}.16
(4) The algebraic closure of A is17
acl(A) def= {b : b is algebraic over A}.18
(5) If A = acl(A), we say that A is algebraically closed. When dcl(A) and acl(A)19
coincide, cl(A) denotes their common value.20
Definition 0.7. (1) For a theory T and a cardinal λ, models {Mi : i < i∗} of T , each of21
size λ, are jointly universal iff for every N a model of T of size λ there is an i < i∗ and an22
isomorphic embedding of N into Mi .23
(2) For T and λ as above,
univ(T, λ) def= min{|M| : M is a family of jointly
universal models of T of size λ}.
To make Definition 0.7 more readable, note that univ(T, λ) = 1 iff there is a universal24
model of T of size λ. The following is the main definition of Shelah’s [18].25
Definition 0.8 (Shelah, [18]). Let n ≥ 3 be a natural number.26
(1) A formula ϕ(x¯, y¯) is said to exemplify the n-strong order property, SOPn if lg(x¯) =27
lg(y¯), and there are a¯k for k < ω, each of length lg(x¯) such that28
(a) |= ϕ[a¯k, a¯m] for k < m < ω,29
(b) |= ¬(∃x¯0, . . . , x¯n−1)[∧{ϕ(x¯	, x¯k) : 	, k < n and k = 	 + 1 mod n}].30
T has SOPn if there is a formula ϕ(x¯, y¯) exemplifying this.31
(2) A theory that does not possess SOPn is said to have NSOPn .
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Note 0.9. Using a compactness argument and the Ramsey theorem, one can prove that if 1
T is a theory with SOPn and ϕ(x¯, y¯), and 〈a¯n : n < ω〉 exemplify it, without loss of 2
generality 〈a¯n : n < ω〉 is an indiscernible sequence. See [10] or [6] for examples of such 3
arguments. 4
Example 0.10. The model completion of the theory of triangle-free graphs is a 5
prototypical example of a SOP3 theory, with the formula ϕ(x, y) just stating that x and 6
y are connected. It can be shown that this theory is NSOP4; see [18]. 7
The following fact indicates that SOPn(3 ≤ n < ω) form a hierarchy, and the thesis is 8
that this hierarchy is reflected in the complexity of the behaviour of the relevant theories 9
under natural constructions in model theory. 10
Fact 0.11 (Shelah, [18], Section 2). For 3 ≤ n < ω the property SOPn+1 of a theory 11
implies the property SOPn . 12
1. The oak property 13
In this section we define a theory T ∗ that will serve as a prototype of a theory that 14
possesses the oak property. Then we introduce the oak property and prove that the theory 15
T ∗ has this property. We are interested in the connection between the oak property and 16
the SOP hierarchy (see Definition 0.8). To this end we shall show that T ∗ satisfies NSOP3 17
(so by Fact 0.11 it clearly does not satisfy SOP4). As another example we shall show that 18
the model completion of the theory of infinitely many indexed independent equivalence 19
relations, T ∗feq, also satisfies oak and NSOP3. This theory is known not to be simple [18], 20
but we shall in fact show that no theory with the oak property is simple. 21
We commence with some auxiliary theories which will allow us to define T ∗ (as the 22
model completion of T +0 ). 23
Definition 1.1. (1) Let T0 be the following theory in the language 24
{Q0, Q1, Q2, F0, F1, F2, F3} : 25
(i) Q0, Q1, Q2 are unary predicates which form a partition of the universe, 26
(ii) F0 is a partial function from Q1 to Q0, 27
(iii) F1 is a partial two-place function from Q0 × Q2 to Q1, 28
(iv) F2 is a partial function from Q0 to Q2, 29
(v) F3 is a partial function from Q2 to Q0, 30
(vi) the range of F1 is included in the domain of F0 and for all (x, z) ∈ Dom(F1) we have 31
F0(F1(x, z)) = x , and 32
(vii) the range of F2 is included in the domain of F3 and F3(F2(x)) = x for all 33
x ∈ Dom(F2). 34
(2) Let T +0 be defined like T0, but with the requirement that F0, F1, F2 and F3 are total 35
functions. 36
Remark 1.2. It is to be noted that the above definition of T0 uses partial rather than the 37
more usual full function symbols. Using partial functions we have to be careful when we 38
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speak about submodels, where we have a choice of deciding whether statements of the1
form “Fl(x) is undefined” are preserved in the larger model. We choose to request that2
the fact that Fl is undefined at a certain entry is not necessarily preserved in the larger3
model. Functions F2 and F3 are “dummies” whose sole purpose is to ensure that models of4
T +0 are non-trivial, while keeping T
+
0 a universal theory (which is useful when discussing5
the model completion). Also note that neither T0 nor T +0 is complete, but every model6
M of T0 in which QM0 , QM2 = ∅ and F0 and F3 are onto can be extended to a model7
of T +0 with the same universe (Claim 1.4(2)), and every model of T0 is a submodel of8
a model of T +0 (Claim 1.4(4)). T +0 has a complete model completion (Claim 1.5). This9
model completion is the main theory we shall work with and, as we shall show, it has the10
oak property (Claim 1.11) and is NSOP4 (Claim 1.7).11
As we are only interested in the model completion T ∗ of T +0 we might have omitted the12
mention of T0 altogether, but in the interest of possible future examples and also in order13
to make the proof of the existence of T ∗ easier, through Claim 1.4 we defined both T0 and14
T +0 and then showed how to pass from models of one to models of the other.15
Example 1.3. Suppose that κ and λ are infinite cardinals and f is any surjective function16
from κλ to κ , while g is a function from κ to κλ satisfying g( f (ν)) = ν for all ν ∈ κλ.17
Then we can construct a model M = Mκ,λ, f,g as follows: let QM0 be κ , QM1 be κ>λ, and18
QM2 = κλ. Further let F M0 (η) be the length of η for η ∈ Q1, and let F M1 (α, ν) = ν  α.19
Let F M3 be f and let F M2 be g.20
We consider such examples to be prototypical for models of T +0 .21
Claim 1.4. (1) If M is a model of T +0 , then QM0 , QM1 and QM2 are all non-empty, and F M022
and F M3 are onto.23
(2) Every model M of T0 in which QM0 = ∅ and QM2 = ∅, while F M0 and F M3 are onto,24
can be extended to a model of T +0 with the same universe (and every model of T +0 is a25
model of T0).26
(3) There are models M of T0 with QM0 = ∅ and QM2 = ∅ and F M3 onto which cannot be27
extended to a model of T +0 with the same universe.28
(4) Every model of T0 is a submodel of a model of T +0 .29
(5) T +0 has the amalgamation property and the joint embedding property JEP.30
(6) If M |= T0 and A ⊆ M is finite, then the closure B of A under F M0 , F M1 , F M2 and F M331
is finite (in fact |B| ≤ |A|2 + 2|A|); moreover:32
(a) B ∩ QM2 = (A ∩ QM2 ) ∪ {F M2 (a) : a ∈ A ∩ QM0 },33
(b) B ∩ QM0 = (A ∩ QM0 ) ∪ {F M0 (b) : b ∈ A ∩ QM1 } ∪ {F M3 (c) : c ∈ A ∩ QM2 } and34
(c) B ∩ QM1 = (A ∩ QM1 ) ∪ {F M1 (a, c) : a ∈ B ∩ QM0 & c ∈ B ∩ QM2 }.35
In this case, B |= T0 and if M |= T +0 , then B |= T +0 .36
To declutter the notation we shall from now on whenever possible in discussing T0, T +037
(and its model completion T ∗ which will be introduced later) omit the superscript M from38
the function symbols.39
Proof. (1) As M is a model we have that M = ∅, so at least one among QM0 , QM1 , QM2 is40
not empty.41
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If QM0 = ∅, then F2 guarantees that QM2 = ∅, so QM1 = ∅ because of F1. If 1
QM1 = ∅, then QM0 = ∅ because of F0. Finally, if QM2 = ∅, then QM0 = ∅ because of 2
F3, and we can again argue as above. 3
If a ∈ QM0 , let b ∈ QM2 be arbitrary. Then F1(a, b) ∈ QM1 and F0(F1(a, b)) = a. 4
Hence, F0 is onto. Also, F3(F2(a)) = a, so F M3 is onto. 5
(2) Let M |= T0 and QM0 , QM2 = ∅. For x ∈ QM0 and z ∈ QM2 such that (x, z) /∈ 6
Dom(F M1 ), let F1(x, z) = y for any y ∈ QM1 such that F0(y) = x , which exists as F M0 7
is already onto. For x ∈ QM0 for which F2(x) is not already defined, let F2(x) = z for 8
any z such that F3(z) = x , which exists as F M3 is onto. Finally, extend F0 and F3 to be 9
total. The model described is a model of T +0 with the same universe as M . 10
(3) Let κ1 < κ2 < λ and let QM0 = κ2, QM1 = κ1>λ, while QM2 = κ1λ. For 11
α < κ2 let F2(α) be the function in κ1λ which is constantly α, and for ν ∈ κ1λ let 12
F3(ν) = min(Rang(ν)) if this value is < κ2, and 0 otherwise. Also, let F0(η) = lg(η) 13
and F1(α, ν) = ν  α be defined for ν ∈ κ1λ and α < κ1. 14
This is a model of T0, but not of T +0 because F1 is not total. If this model were to 15
be extended to a model of T +0 with the same universe, we would have that for every 16
ν ∈ κ1λ 17
F0(F1(κ1, ν)) = κ1 & F1(κ1, ν) = η 18
for some η ∈ κ1>λ. As F0(η) is already defined, F0(η) = lg(η) < κ1, which is a 19
contradiction. 20
(4) Given a model M of T0. First ensure that QM0 , QM1 , QM2 = ∅ by adding new elements 21
if necessary. Then make sure that F0 and F3 are total and onto, which might require 22
adding new elements to M (and hence redefining QM0 , QM1 , QM2 if needed). Now for 23
each x ∈ QM0 choose y(x) ∈ QM1 such that F0(y(x)) = x , which is possible since F0 24
is onto, and then define for every (x, z) ∈ QM0 × QM2 the value of F1(x, z) to be y(x), 25
unless F1(x, z) has already been defined to start with, in which case we leave it at that 26
value. Finally declare for x ∈ QM0 for which F2(x) has not already been defined that 27
F2(x) = z for any z such that F3(z) = x , which can be done since F3 is onto. 28
(5) We first prove the amalgamation property. Suppose that M0, M1 and M2 are models 29
of T +0 with |M1| ∩ |M2| = |M0|, and M0 ⊆ M1, M2. We define M3 as follows. Let 30
|M3| = |M1|⋃ |M2|, and for m ∈ {0, 2, 3} let F M3m (x) = F Mlm (x) if x ∈ Ml for 31
some l. This is well defined, because M1 and M2 agree on M0. Also, the identity 32
F3(F2(x)) = x is satisfied in M3. Now we let F M31 = F M11 ∪ F M21 . This does not 33
necessarily give us a total function, but we still have a model of T0 with universe 34
|M1| ∪ |M2| and so to obtain the desired amalgam (which has the same universe) we 35
apply part (2) of this claim. From this definition it follows that both M1 and M2 are 36
submodels of M3 and equal to its restriction to their respective universes. 37
To see that JEP holds, suppose that we are given two models M1, M2 of T +0 . Define 38
M by letting its universe be the disjoint union of M1 and M2, and define the functions 39
Fm for m ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} by F Mm = F M1m ∪ F M2m . Then M is a model of T0, but like in the 40
proof of amalgamation, the function F1 might happen to be only partial, in which case 41
we extend M to a model of T +0 by applying part (2) of this claim. Then it can easily be 42
checked that M embeds both M1 and M2. 43
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(6) Suppose that A and M are as in the assumptions. Then items (a)–(c) of the statement1
uniquely define a subset of M , which we shall call B . The proof will be complete if we2
can prove that B is of the required size and is the closure of A.3
Clearly B is contained in the closure of A and the size of B is as claimed. That is,4
letting for l ∈ {0, 1, 2} the size of A ∩ QMl be nl and n = Σl<3nl , we have first that5
|B ∩ QM2 | ≤ n2+n0, then |B ∩ QM0 | ≤ n0+n1+n2 ≤ n, and so |B ∩ QM1 | ≤ n1+n2.6
It can be checked directly that B is closed, using the equations for T0, and it also easily7
follows that B is a model of T0, or of T +0 if M is. 8
Claim 1.5. T +0 has a complete model completion T ∗ which admits elimination of9
quantifiers, and is ℵ0-categorical. In this theory the closure and the algebraic closure10
coincide.11
Proof. We can construct T ∗ directly. T ∗ admits elimination of quantifiers because T +012
has the amalgamation property and is universal ([2] 3.5.19). It can be seen from the13
construction of T ∗ that it is complete, or alternatively, it can be seen that T ∗ has JEP14
and so by [2] 3.5.11, it is complete. To see that the theory is ℵ0-categorical, observe that15
Claim 1.4(6) implies that for every n there are only finitely many T0-types in n-variables.16
Then by the Characterisation of Complete ℵ0-categorical Theories ([2] 2.3.13), T ∗ is ℵ0-17
categorical. Using the elimination of quantifiers and the fact that all relational symbols18
of the language of T ∗ have infinite domains in every model of T ∗, we can see that the19
algebraic closure and the definable closure coincide in T ∗. 20
Observation 1.6. If A, B ⊆ CT ∗ are closed and c ∈ cl(A ∪ B) \ A \ B , then c ∈ QCT ∗1 .21
Proof. Notice that
cl(A ∪ B) =A ∪ B ∪ {F1(a, c) : a ∈ (A ∪ B) ∩ Q0 & c ∈ (A ∪ B) ∩ Q2
& {a, c}  A & {a, c}  B}
by Claim 1.4(6). 22
Claim 1.7. T ∗ is NSOP3, consequently NSOP4.23
Proof. Suppose that T ∗ is SOP3 and let ϕ(x¯, y¯), and 〈a¯n : n < ω〉 exemplify this in a
model M (see Definition 0.8(1)). Without loss of generality, by redefining ϕ if necessary,
each a¯n is without repetition and is closed (recall Claim 1.4(6)). By the Ramsey theorem
and compactness, we can assume that the given sequence is a part of an indiscernible
sequence 〈a¯k : k ∈ Z〉; hence a¯k’s form a ∆-system. Let for k ∈ Z
X<k
def=
⋂
m<k
cl(a¯mˆa¯k), X>k def=
⋂
m>k
cl(a¯mˆa¯k), Xk = cl(X<k ∪ X>k ).
Hence Rang(a¯k) ⊆ Xk , and Xk is closed. By Claim 1.4(6), there is an a priori finite bound24
on the size of Xk ; hence by indiscernibility, we have that |Xk | = n∗ for some fixed n∗25
not depending on k. Let a¯+k list Xk with no repetition. By Observation 1.6, Claim 1.4(6),26
indiscernibility and the fact that each a¯k is closed, we have that for l ∈ {0, 2}27
cl(a¯mˆa¯k) ∩ QCl = (Rang(a¯m) ∪ Rang(a¯k)) ∩ QCl28
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and 1
Xk ∩ QC0 ⊆ Rang(a¯k) ∩ QC0 and Xk ∩ QC2 ⊆ Rang(a¯k) ∩ QC2 . 2
Applying the Ramsey theorem again, without loss of generality we have that 〈a¯+k : k ∈ Z〉 3
are indiscernible. Let 4
w∗0
def= {l : a¯+k1(l) = a¯+k2(l) for some (equivalently all) k1 = k2}. 5
If a¯+k1(l1) = a¯+k2(l2) for some k1 = k2, without loss of generality k1 < k2, by 6
indiscernibility and symmetry. By transitivity and the fact that each a¯+k is without 7
repetition, using k1 < k2 < k3 we get l1 = l2 ∈ w∗0. Let w∗1 def= n∗ \ w∗0, and 8
let a¯ = a¯+k  w∗0 and a¯′k = a¯+k  w∗1 . Hence, 〈a¯ˆa¯′k : k ∈ Z〉 is an indiscernible 9
sequence, and Rang(a¯) ∩ Rang(a¯′k) = ∅ for all k. In addition, for k1 = k2 we have 10
Rang(a¯′k1) ∩ Rang(a¯′k2) = ∅ and Rang(a¯ˆa¯′k) = Xk . 11
Now we define a model N . Its universe is ∪0≤l<3{clM (a¯ˆa¯′lˆa¯′l+1)}, and QNi = QMi ∩N , 12
F Nj = ∪{Fj,l : l < 3}, where Fj,l = F Mj  clM (a¯ˆa¯′lˆa¯′l+1), or Fj,l = F Mj  13
(clM (a¯ˆa¯′lˆa¯′l+1))2, as appropriate. Note that N is well defined, and that it is a model of 14
T0. N is not necessarily a model of T +0 , as the function F1 may be only partial. Notice 15
that Xl ⊆ N for l ∈ [0, 3]. We wish to define N ′ like N , but identifying a¯+0 and a¯+3 16
coordinatewise. We shall now check that this will give a well defined model of T0. Note 17
that by the proof of Observation 1.6 we have 18
N ′ =
⋃
0≤l<3
Xl ∪
⋃
0≤l<3
{F N1 (c, d) : c, d ∈ Xl ∪ Xl+1
& {c, d}  Xl & {c, d}  Xl+1 & F N1 (c, d) /∈ Xl ∪ Xl+1}. 19
The possible problem is that F N ′i might not be well defined, i.e. there could perhaps 20
be a case defined in two distinct ways. We verify that this does not happen, by discussing 21
various possibilities. 22
Case 1. For some b ∈ Rang(a¯+0 ), say b = a¯+0 (t), b′ = a¯+3 (t) and j ∈ {0, 2, 3}, we 23
have Fj (b) = Fj (b′) after the identification of a¯+0 with a¯+3 . As a¯+k ’s are closed, we have 24
Fj (b) = a¯+0 (s) and Fj (b′) = a¯+3 (s′) for some s, s′. By indiscernibility, we have s = s′, 25
hence the identification will make Fj (b) = Fj (b′). 26
Case 2. For some s, t we have that F1(a¯+0 (s), a¯
+
0 (t)) and F1(a¯
+
3 (s), a¯
+
3 (t)) are well 27
defined, but not the same after the identification of a¯+0 and a¯
+
3 . This case cannot happen, 28
as can be seen similarly to in Case 1. 29
Case 3. For some τ (x, y) ∈ {F1(x, y), F1(y, x)} and d1 = a¯+0 (s), d2 = a¯+3 (s) and 30
some e ∈ N we have that τ N (e, d1), τ N (e, d2) are well defined but do not get identified 31
when N ′ is defined. 32
By Case 2, we have that e /∈ a¯ and s /∈ w∗0. As τ (e, d1) is well defined and d1 ∈ X0 \ a¯, 33
necessarily e ∈ clM (X0 ∪ X1). Similarly, as τ (e, d2) is well defined and d2 ∈ X3 \ a¯, we 34
have e ∈ clM (X2 ∪ X3). But, as F1(e, dl) is well defined, we have e ∈ Q2 ∪ Q0. Hence 35
e ∈ clM (X0 ∪ X1) \ Q1 ⊆ X0 ∪ X1 and similarly e ∈ X2 ∪ X3. This implies e ∈ a¯, a 36
contradiction. 37
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
F
ARTICLE  IN  PRESS
M. Džamonja, S. Shelah / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic xx (xxxx) xxx–xxx 11
APAL: 1636
As M is a model of T0, F M0 is onto (Claim 1.4(1)). Suppose y ∈ QN0 ; then for1
some l ∈ [0, 3) we have that y ∈ clM (Xl ∪ Xl+1), so by Observation 1.6, we have2
y ∈ Xl ∪ Xl+1. As each Xl is closed in M , by Claim 1.4(6) each Xl is a model of T +0 , so3
y ∈ Rang(F M0  Xl); hence y ∈ Rang(F N0 ) and y ∈ Rang(F N
′
0 ). We can similarly prove4
that F N ′3 is onto, and as each Xl is a model of T
+
0 we have by Claim 1.4(1) that QN
′
0 , QN
′
15
and QN ′2 are all non-empty. By Claim 1.4(2), N ′ can be extended to a model of T +0 .6
By the choice of ϕ and the fact that T ∗ is complete we have that7
T ∗ |= (∀x¯0, x¯1, x¯2)¬[ϕ(x¯0, x¯1) ∧ ϕ(x¯1, x¯2) ∧ ϕ(x¯2, x¯0)].8
As T ∗ is the model completion of T +0 , in particular T ∗ and T
+
0 are cotheories, so we have9
that10
T +0 |= (∀x¯0, x¯1, x¯2)¬[ϕ(x¯0, x¯1) ∧ ϕ(x¯1, x¯2) ∧ ϕ(x¯2, x¯0)],11
yet in N ′ we have12
N ′ |= ϕ(a¯0, a¯1) ∧ ϕ(a¯1, a¯2) ∧ ϕ(a¯2, a¯0),13
by the identification of a¯0 and a¯3. This is a contradiction. 14
Definition 1.8. (1) A theory T is said to satisfy the oak property as exhibited by a formula15
ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯) iff for any infinite λ, κ there are b¯η(η ∈ κ>λ) and c¯ν(ν ∈ κλ) and a¯i (i < κ)16
such that17
(a) [η  ν & ν ∈ κλ] =⇒ ϕ[a¯lg(η), b¯η, c¯ν],18
(b) If η ∈ κ>λ and ηˆ〈α〉  ν1 ∈ κλ and ηˆ〈β〉  ν2 ∈ κλ, while α = β and i > lg(η),19
then ¬∃y¯ [ϕ(a¯i , y¯, c¯ν1) ∧ ϕ(a¯i , y¯, c¯ν2)],20
and in addition ϕ satisfies21
(c) ϕ(x¯, y¯1, z¯) ∧ ϕ(x¯, y¯2, z¯) =⇒ y¯1 = y¯2.22
We allow for the replacement of CT by CeqT (i.e. allow y¯ to be a definable equivalence23
class).24
(2) We say that oak holds for T if this is true for some ϕ.25
Observation 1.9. If some infinite λ, κ exemplify that oak(ϕ) holds, then so do all infinite26
λ, κ . (This holds by the compactness theorem.)27
Remark 1.10. We shall not need to use this, but let us remark that witnesses a¯, b¯, c¯ to28
oak(ϕ) can be chosen to be indiscernible along an appropriate index set (a tree). This29
can be proved using the technique of [10], Chapter VII, which employs the compactness30
argument and an appropriate partition theorem.31
Claim 1.11. T ∗ has oak.32
Proof. Let33
ϕ(x, y, z) def= Q0(x) ∧ Q1(y) ∧ Q2(z) ∧ F0(y) = x ∧ F1(x, z) = y.34
Clearly, (c) of Definition 1.8(1) is satisfied. Given λ, κ , we shall define a model N = Nλ,κ35
of T +0 . This will be a submodel of C = CT ∗ such that its universe consists of QN0 def=36
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{ai : i < κ} with no repetitions, QN1 def= {bη : η ∈ κ>λ} with no repetitions and 1
QN2
def= {cν : ν ∈ κλ} with no repetitions, while Q0, Q1, Q2 are pairwise disjoint. We 2
also require that the following are satisfied in C = CT ∗ : 3
F0(bη) = alg(η), F1(ai , cν) = bνi 4
and that N is closed under F2 and F3. That such a choice is possible can be seen by writing 5
the corresponding type and using the saturativity of C. 6
We can check that N |= T +0 , and that N is a submodel of C when understood as a 7
model of T +0 . Clearly, (a) from Definition 1.8(1) is satisfied for ϕ and ai , bη, cν in place 8
of a¯i , b¯η, c¯ν respectively. To see (b), suppose that η, α, β, ν1, ν2 and i are as there, but d is 9
such that ϕ(ai , d, cν1) ∧ ϕ(ai , d, cν2). Hence F1(ai , cν1) = F1(ai , cν2), so ν1  i = ν2  i , 10
a contradiction. This shows that ϕ is a witness for T ∗ having oak.  11
A similar argument can be used to show that T ∗ is not simple, but in fact we shall prove 12
that no theory with the oak property is simple (this in particular answers a question of 13
A. Dolich raised in a private communication). 14
Claim 1.12. No theory with the oak property is simple. 15
Proof. Let T be a theory with the oak property and let κ, λ be cardinals such that κ > |T |, 16
2κ < λ and λ = λ<κ < λκ (such cardinals always exist). By Observation 1.9 we may 17
assume that the oak property of T is exemplified by a formula ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯) and sequences 18
〈a¯i : i < κ〉, 〈b¯η : η ∈ κ>λ〉 and 〈c¯ν : ν ∈ κλ〉. For ν ∈ κλ let pν = pν(z¯) def= 19
{ϕ(a¯i , b¯νi , z¯) : i < κ}. Hence each pν is a type of cardinality κ and the set {pν : ν ∈ κλ} 20
consists of pairwise incompatible types. The set of parameters used in
⋃{pν : ν ∈ κλ} has 21
size ≤ κ · λ<κ = λ. By [[10], III, 7.7, pg. 141] this implies that T is not simple.  22
We now pass to another example of a theory with oak that satisfies NSOP3, which is the 23
theory T ∗feq of infinitely many indexed independent equivalence relations. This example 24
also shows why it is that this research continues [16]. The readers uninterested in T ∗feq can 25
skip to the next section without loss of continuity. We use the notation for T ∗feq which was 26
used in [4], while the fact that this is equivalent to the notation in [16] was explained in [4]. 27
The existence of the required model completion is explained in [4]. 28
Definition 1.13. (1) T +feq is the following theory in {Q, P, E, R, F}: 29
(a) Predicates P and Q are unary and disjoint, and (∀x) [P(x) ∨ Q(x)]. 30
(b) E is an equivalence relation on Q. 31
(c) R is a binary relation on Q × P such that 32
[x R z & y R z & x E y] =⇒ x = y. 33
(Explanation: so R picks for each z ∈ Q (at most) one representative of any E-equivalence class.) 34
(d) F is a (total) binary function from Q × P to Q, which satisfies 35
F(x, z) ∈ Q & (F(x, z) R z) & (x E F(x, z)) . 36
(Explanation: so for x ∈ Q and z ∈ P , the function F picks the representative of the E-equivalence class of x which 37
is in the relation R with z.) 38
(2) T ∗feq is the model completion of T +feq.
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Remark 1.14. After renaming, CeqT ∗feq is a reduct of C
eq
T ∗ ; formally T
∗
feq is interpretable in1
T ∗. Given a model M of T ∗, we define N = N1[M] by letting its universe be QM1
⋃ QM22
and P N = QM2 , while QN = QM1 . We let3
y Ez iff F M0 (y) = F M0 (z) and F N (x, z) = F1(F0(x), z).4
We also let x R z ⇐⇒ F N (x, z) = x . It is easily seen that N |= T +feq, and moreover,5
N |= T ∗feq.6
Using the above Remark and the fact that oak and NSOP3 are preserved up to7
isomorphism of Ceq, we obtain:8
Corollary 1.15. (1) T ∗feq has oak.9
(2) T ∗feq has NSOP3.110
Proof. (1) Use the formula ϕ(x, y, z) ≡ F(x, z) = y.11
(2) Follows by Remark 1.14. 12
Part (2) of Corollary 1.15 was stated without proof in [18]. The results here suggest the13
following questions.14
Question 1.16. (1) Does T ∗ satisfy SOP2 or SOP1?15
(2) Are there any nontrivial examples of oak theories that have SOP3?16
Properties SOP2 or SOP1 were introduced in [4] where it was shown that SOP3 =⇒17
SO P2 =⇒ SO P2 =⇒ not simple, but it was left open to decide whether any of these18
implications is reversible. These properties are studied further in [24] where it is proved19
that T ∗feq has NSOP1. This makes it reasonable to conjecture that the answer to both parts20
of 1.16 is positive.21
We finish the section by quoting a result of Shelah from [16], which can be compared22
with our non-universality results from Section 2. The notation is explained in Section 2.23
Theorem 1.17 (Shelah). Suppose that κ,µ and λ are cardinals satisfying24
(1) κ = cf(µ) < µ, λ = cf(λ),25
(2) µ+ < λ,26
(3) there is a family27
{(ai , bi ) : i < i∗, ai ∈ [λ]<µ, bi ∈ [λ]κ}28
such that |{bi : i < i∗}| ≤ λ and satisfying that for every f : λ → λ there is i such29
that f (bi ) ⊆ ai ; and30
(4) ppΓ (κ)(µ) > λ + |i∗|.31
Then univ(T +feq, λ) ≥ ppΓ (κ)(µ).32
1 It has subsequently been proved by Shelah and Usvyatsov in [24] that T ∗feq has a stronger property NSOP1.
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2. Non-universality results 1
In this section we present two general theorems showing that under certain cardinal 2
arithmetic assumptions oak theories do not admit universal models. Let us start by 3
introducing some common abbreviations that we shall use in the statements and the proofs 4
in this section. 5
Notation 2.1. (1) Let κ ≤ λ be cardinals. We let 6
[λ]κ def= {A ⊆ λ : |A| = κ}. 7
If κ is regular we let 8
Sλκ
def= {α < λ : cf(α) = κ}. 9
(2) For a set A of ordinals we let the set of accumulation points of A be acc(A) def= {α ∈ 10
A : α = sup(A ∩ α)} and the set of non-accumulation points be nacc(A) def= A \ acc(A). 11
Before proceeding to the non-universality theorems recall from the Introduction the def- 12
inition of a tight club guessing sequence (Definition 0.2). Note that the definition does not 13
require sets Cδ to be either closed or unbounded in δ. It can be deduced from the existing 14
literature on club guessing sequences that tight and truly tight club guessing sequences 15
exist for many triples (κ, µ, λ). We shall indicate in Claim 2.10 how this deduction can be 16
made, but let us leave this for the discussion on the consistency of the assumptions of the 17
non-universality theorems, which will be given after their proofs. We shall now give two 18
non-universality theorems. These theorems have set-theoretic and model-theoretic assump- 19
tions. The model-theoretic assumption is the same in both cases: that we are dealing with 20
an oak theory of size < λ, with the desired conclusion being that the universality number 21
univ(T, λ) is larger than λ. The set-theoretic assumptions, which are different for the two 22
theorems, will be phrased in the form of certain combinatorial statements that are needed 23
for the proofs of the theorem. As with tight club guessing sequences, it might not be imme- 24
diately clear to the reader that these assumptions are consistent. However, after we prove 25
the theorems we shall give some sufficient conditions for these assumptions to be satisfied 26
and as a corollary get some non-universality results whose set-theoretic assumptions are 27
phrased in the form of cardinal arithmetic and known to be consistent. 28
Theorems 2.2 and 2.4 have similar proofs, as we explain below, so we shall first state 29
both theorems and then give the proofs simultaneously. 30
Theorem 2.2. Assume that κ,µ, σ and λ are cardinals satisfying 31
(1) cf(κ) = κ < µ < λ = cf(λ) and there is a tight (µ, λ) club guessing sequence, 32
(2) λ < µκ , 33
(3) κ ≤ σ ≤ λ, 34
(4) there are families P1 ⊆ [λ]κ and P2 ⊆ [σ ]κ such that 35
(i) for every injective g : σ → λ there is X ∈ P2 with {g(i) : i ∈ X} ∈ P1, 36
(ii) |P1| < µκ, |P2| ≤ λ, 37
(5) T is a theory of size < λ which has the oak property. 38
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Then1
univ(T, λ) ≥ µκ.2
Definition 2.3. For cardinals κ ≤ µ we define3
UJ bdκ (µ)
def= min{|P | : P ⊆ [µ]κ & (∀b ∈ [µ]κ)(∃a ∈ P)(|a ∩ b| = κ}.4
More on UJ bdκ (µ) can be found in [22].5
Theorem 2.4. Assume that κ,µ, σ and λ are cardinals satisfying6
(1) cf(κ) = κ < µ < λ = cf(λ) and there is a tight (µ, λ) club guessing sequence,7
(2) λ < UJ bdκ (µ),8 (3) κ ≤ σ ≤ λ,9
(4) there are families P1 ⊆ [λ]κ and P2 ⊆ [σ ]κ such that10
(i) for every injective g : σ → λ there is X ∈ P2 such that for some Y ∈ P111
|{g(i) : i ∈ X} ∩ Y | = κ,12
(ii) |P1| < UJ bdκ (µ), |P2| ≤ λ,13 (5) T has the oak property.14
Then15
univ(T, λ) ≥ UJ bdκ (µ).16
Before we start the proof let us give an introduction to the methods that appear within17
it. When proving that the universality number of a certain category with given morphisms18
(so not just in the context of first order model theory) is high it is often the case that19
one can associate with each object in the category a certain construct, an invariant, which20
is to some extent preserved by morphisms. For example such an invariant might be an21
ordinal number and then one can prove that such an invariant may only increase after22
an embedding. The proof then proceeds by contradiction by showing that any candidate23
for the universal would have to satisfy too many invariants. A trivial example would be24
to show that there is no countable well-ordering that is universal under order preserving25
embeddings: the order type of the ordering is an invariant that satisfies that if f : P → Q26
is an order preserving embedding, then the order type of Q is at least as large as that of P .27
Any Q that would be universal would have to have a countable well-order type that is larger28
than that of all countable ordinals, a contradiction. As trivial as it is, this example points out29
two stages of a non-universality proof: construction which associates an object with every30
invariant prescribed by a certain set (e.g. the uncountable set of all countable ordinals) and31
preservation that shows that some essential features of the invariant are preserved (e.g.32
the order type does not decrease) under embeddings. In our proofs we shall use the same33
method, except that the invariants will be defined as certain λ-sequences of subsets of µ,34
unique modulo the club filter on λ, and that the preservation and the resulting contradiction35
will be dependent on a certain club guessing sequence. Using such invariants is a technique36
that was first used by Kojman and Shelah in [8] and has appeared in a number of papers37
since. The main point tends to be the right definition of an invariant and the use of a right38
kind of club guessing.39
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Proof. We shall use the same proof for both Theorems 2.2 and 2.4. The two main Lemmas 1
are the same for the two theorems, and we shall indicate the differences which occur toward 2
the end of the proof. Suppose that ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯) shows that T has the oak property and let 3
ai (i < κ), bη (η ∈ κ>λ) and cν(ν ∈ κλ) exemplify the oak property of ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯) for λ 4
and κ . For notational simplicity, let us assume that lg(x¯) = lg(y¯) = lg(z¯) = 1. 5
Let 〈Cδ : δ ∈ S〉 be a tight (µ, λ) club guessing sequence. For each δ, let 〈α(δ, ζ ) : 6
ζ < µ〉 be the increasing enumeration of Cδ . Let C+ be a (saturated enough) expansion of 7
CT by the Skolem functions for CT . 8
Definition 2.5. (1) For N¯ = 〈Nγ : γ < λ〉 an ≺-increasing continuous sequence of 9
models of T of size < λ, and for a, c ∈ Nλ def= ⋃γ<λ Nγ , and δ ∈ S, we let 10
invN¯ (c, Cδ, a)
def= {ζ < µ : (∃b ∈ Nα(δ,ζ+1) \ Nα(δ,ζ ))(Nλ |= ϕ[a, b, c])}. 11
(2) For a set A and δ, N¯ as above, let 12
invAN¯ (c, Cδ)
def=
⋃
{invN¯ (c, Cδ, a) : a ∈ A}. 13
Note 2.6. Following the notation of Definition 2.5, notice that invN¯ (c, Cδ, a) is always a 14
singleton or empty, since if there is b ∈ Nλ such that ϕ[a, b, c] holds then such b is unique 15
(by part (c) of Definition 1.8). Consequently invAN¯ (c, Cδ) ∈ [µ]≤|A|. 16
Construction Lemma 2.7. For every A∗ ∈ [µ]κ of order type κ , there is an ≺-increasing 17
continuous sequence N¯ A∗ = 〈N A∗γ : γ < λ〉 of models of T of size < λ and a set 18
{aˆi : i < σ } of elements of NA∗ def= ⋃γ<λ N A∗γ such that for some club E∗ of λ, for every 19
X ∈ P2, for some αX < λ, for every δ ∈ S satisfying min(Cδ) > αX , there is c ∈ NA∗ 20
such that inv{aˆi : i∈X}N¯A∗ (c, Cδ) = A
∗
. 21
In addition, the universe of NA∗ is λ. 22
Proof of the Lemma. Let P2 = {Xα : α < α∗ ≤ λ}. Without loss of generality 23
σ ⊆⋃α<α∗ Xα . 24
Given A∗. Let f = fA∗ be an increasing function from the successor ordinals < κ 25
into µ such that Rang( f ) = A∗. For δ ∈ S let νδ be the function from κ into λ such that 26
νδ(ζ ) = α(δ, f (ζ )) for all ζ < κ . Note that νδ is increasing. Hence cνδ is well defined, as 27
is bη for η  νδ . For X ∈ P2, let ρX be a bijection between the ordinals < κ that have the 28
form β + 2 for some β and X . For η ∈ κ>λ let us say that η is good iff the domain of η is 29
of the form β + 2 for some β < κ . 30
By a compactness argument, we can see that there are 〈aˆi : i < σ 〉 and for X ∈ P2, 31
sequences 〈cXνδ : δ ∈ S〉, 〈bXη : η  νδ & η good & δ ∈ S〉 such that for η good and δ ∈ S 32
η  νδ =⇒ |= ϕ[aˆρX (lg(η)), bXη , cXνδ ] 33
and the appropriate translation of (b) from Definition 1.8 holds. By taking an isomorphic 34
copy of C+ if necessary, we can assume that the Skolem hull in C+ of 35
{aˆi : i < σ } ∪ {bXη : X ∈ P2 & (∃δ ∈ S)η  νδ} ∪ {cXνδ : X ∈ P2 & δ ∈ S} 36
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is contained in λ. Let for γ < λ the model N A∗γ be the reduction to L(T ) of the Skolem1
hull in C+ of2
γ ∪ {aˆi : i ∈ ∪α<min{α∗,γ }Xα} ∪3
∪
⋃
α<min{α∗,γ }
{cXανδ : δ ∈ S ∩ γ & sup(Rang(νδ)) < γ } ∪
4
∪
⋃
α<min{α∗,γ }
{bXαη : η  νδ for some δ ∈ S & η good & sup(Rang(η)) < γ }.
5
Hence N¯ A∗ = 〈N A∗γ : γ < λ〉 is ≺-increasing continuous, and it also follows that the6
universe of N A∗ def= ⋃γ<λ N A∗γ is λ. We observe also that for γ < λ we have |N A∗γ | < λ7
because λ is regular, T has size < λ and the Skolem hull needed to obtain N A∗γ is taken8
over a set of size < λ. That this set has size < λ might not be immediate, since in the last9
clause of its definition we allow δ to range over the entire set S, whose size is λ. However,10
for every η appearing in this part of the definition, η is increasing (as an initial segment of11
some νδ) and it satisfies sup(Rang(η)) < γ . Since the domain of η is of the form β + 212
for some β, this means η(β + 1) < γ . For any δ ∈ S such that η  νδ we have that13
η(β + 1) ∈ Cδ , so either η(β + 1) ∈ nacc(Cδ) or for some γ ′ ∈ nacc(Cδ) we have that14
η(β) < γ ′ < η(β + 1). At any rate, Rang(η) is a subset of size < κ of a set of the form15
Cδ ∩ ξ ∪ {o} for some ξ ∈ nacc(Cδ) and ξ, o are both < γ . As part of the choice of C¯ we16
obtain that for any ξ < γ17
|{Cδ ∩ ξ : δ ∈ S, ξ ∈ nacc(Cδ)}| < λ.18
For δ ∈ S and ξ ∈ nacc(Cδ) let ζ ∗(δ, ξ) def= min{ζ : α(δ, f (ζ )) ≥ ξ}, if this is well19
defined, and let ζ ∗(δ, ξ) = κ otherwise. Now notice that if Cδ ∩ ξ = Cδ′ ∩ ξ then we have20
ζ ∗(δ, ξ) = ζ ∗(δ′, ξ) and that νδ  ζ ∗(δ, ξ) = νδ′  ζ ∗(δ′, ξ). Our analysis shows that any η21
relevant to the third clause of the definition of N A∗γ and having domain β + 2 satisfies that22
η  (β + 1) = (νδ  ζ ∗(δ, ξ))  (β + 1) for some δ ∈ S and ξ < γ and hence that there are23
< λ choices for bXαη . Let E∗ be a club of λ such that for every δ ∈ E∗ and good η we have24
bXβη ∈ N A∗δ iff β < δ & (∃δ′ ∈ S ∩ δ)[η  νδ′ ].25
Given α < α∗, X = Xα and δ ∈ S with min(Cδ) ≥ α + 1 and Cδ ⊆ E∗, we shall show26
that with27
I def= inv{aˆi : i∈X}N¯ A∗ (cXνδ , Cδ)28
we have I = A∗. Notice that ε < κ =⇒ α(δ, f (ε)) > α trivially since min(Cδ) > α.29
Let i ∈ X , β + 2 = ρ−1X (i) and let η = 〈α(δ, f (ε)) : ε ≤ β + 1〉. We have that η  νδ30
and i = ρX (lg(η)). Hence ϕ[aˆi , bXη , cXνδ ] holds. Let ζ = f (β + 1). We then have that31
bXη ∈ N A∗α(δ,ζ )+1 ⊆ N A
∗
α(δ,ζ+1) (as α(δ, ζ ) + 1 is strictly larger than sup(Rang(η)) = α(δ, ζ )32
and α < α(δ, ζ ) + 1), but bXη /∈ N A∗α(δ,ζ ) by the choice of E∗. Hence ζ = f (β + 1) ∈ I . So33
A∗ ⊆ I because every element of A∗ is f (β + 1) for some β as above.34
In the other direction, suppose ζ ∈ I and let i ∈ X be such that ζ is in35
invN¯ A∗ (cXνδ , Cδ, aˆi ). Hence for some b ∈ N A
∗
α(δ,ζ+1) \ N A
∗
α(δ,ζ ) we have |= ϕ[aˆi , b, cXνδ ].36
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Constructing η as in the previous paragraph we have that |= ϕ[aˆi , bXη , cXνδ ] holds. Using the 1
uniqueness property from (c) of Definition 1.8 we see that b = bXη so ζ = f (β + 1) for 2
some β. So A∗ = I .  3
Note 2.8. With the notation of Lemma 2.7, for any i ∈ ⋃α<min{α∗,δ} Xα we have 4
invN¯ A∗ (cXδ , Cδ, aˆi ) = ∅, as follows from the forward direction of the proof that A∗ = I . 5
Preservation Lemma 2.9. Suppose that N and N∗ are models of T both with universe λ,
and f : N → N∗ is an elementary embedding, while 〈Nγ : γ < λ〉 and 〈N∗γ : γ < λ〉 are
continuous increasing sequences of models of T of cardinality < λ with ⋃γ<λ Nγ = N
and
⋃
γ<λ N∗γ = N∗. Further suppose that {aˆα : α < κ} ⊆ N is given. Let
E def=
{
γ : (N, N
∗, f )  γ ≺ (N, N∗, f ) & sup({aα : α < κ}) < γ &
the universes of Nγ and N∗γ are both the set γ
}
.
Then for every c ∈ N and δ with Cδ ⊆ E, and for every α < κ we have 6
invN¯ (c, Cδ, aˆα) = invN¯∗ ( f (c), Cδ, f (aˆα)). 7
Proof of the Lemma. Note that E is a club of λ. Fix c ∈ N and δ ∈ S as required, and let 8
a = aα for some α < κ . We shall see that invN¯ (c, Cδ, a) = invN¯∗ ( f (c), Cδ, f (a)). 9
Suppose ζ < µ is an element of invN¯ (c, Cδ, a), so there is b ∈ Nα(δ,ζ+1) with 10
N |= ϕ[a, b, c], while there is no such b ∈ Nα(δ,ζ ) (we are using the uniqueness property 11
from (c) of Definition 1.8). We have that N∗ satisfies ϕ[ f (a), f (b), f (c)]. As Cδ ⊆ E we 12
have that α(δ, ζ + 1) ∈ E , and as b ∈ Nα(δ,ζ+1), clearly f (b) ∈ N∗α(δ,ζ+1). Similarly, by 13
the definition of E again and the fact that f is injective we have f (b) /∈ N∗α(δ,ζ ). By the 14
assumptions on ϕ we have 15
N∗ |= “(∀y)[ϕ( f (a), y, f (c)) =⇒ y = f (b)]”, 16
so ζ ∈ invN¯∗ ( f (c), Cδ, f (a)). 17
In the other direction, suppose ζ < µ is an element of invN¯∗ ( f (c), Cδ, f (a)), so there 18
is b∗ ∈ N∗α(δ,ζ+1) with N∗ |= ϕ[ f (a), b∗, f (c)], while there is no such b∗ ∈ N∗α(δ,ζ ). 19
Hence N∗ |= ∃y (ϕ[ f (a), y, f (c)]), so N |= ∃y (ϕ[a, y, c]). Let b ∈ N be such that 20
N |= ϕ[a, b, c]. Hence N∗ |= ϕ[ f (a), f (b), f (c)]. Again by (c) of Definition 1.8, we 21
have f (b) = b∗, so b ∈ Nα(δ,ζ+1) \ Nα(δ,ζ ) because {α(δ, ζ ), α(δ, ζ + 1)} ⊆ E , so by the 22
choice of E we have that for γ ∈ {α(δ, ζ ), α(δ, ζ + 1)}, (N, N∗, f )  γ is an elementary 23
submodel of (N, N∗, f ). As this b is unique (by (c) of Definition 1.8) we have that ζ 24
belongs to invN¯ (c, Cδ, a).  25
Proof of the Theorems continued (Theorem 2.2 (Theorem 2.4)). To conclude the proof 26
of the theorems, given θ < µκ [θ < UJ bdκ (µ)], we shall see that univ(T, λ) > θ . 27
Without loss of generality, we can assume that θ ≥ λ + |P1|. Given 〈N∗j : j < θ〉 a 28
sequence of models of T each of size λ, we shall show that these models are not jointly 29
universal. So suppose they were. Without loss of generality, the universe of each N∗j is λ. 30
Let N¯∗j = 〈N∗γ, j : γ < λ〉 be an increasing continuous sequence of models of T of size 31
< λ such that N∗j =
⋃
γ<λ N∗γ, j , for j < θ . For each A ∈ P1 (so A ∈ [λ]κ ), δ ∈ S, 32
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
F
ARTICLE  IN  PRESS
M. Džamonja, S. Shelah / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic xx (xxxx) xxx–xxx 19
APAL: 1636
j < θ and d ∈ N∗j , we compute invAN¯∗j (d, Cδ), each time obtaining an element of [µ]
≤κ
.
1
The number of elements of [µ]≤κ obtained in this way is2
≤ |P1| · |S| · θ · λ ≤ θ.3
By the choice of θ [and the definition of UJ bdκ (µ)], we can choose A∗ ∈ [µ]κ such that A∗
is not equal to any of these sets [is almost disjoint (i.e. has intersection of size < κ) to any
one of these sets]. Let N def= NA∗ be as guaranteed to exist by the Construction Lemma,
and let {aˆi : i < σ }, N¯ A∗ def= 〈N A∗γ : γ < λ〉 and E∗ be as in that Lemma. In particular,
the universe of N is λ. Suppose that j < θ and f : N → N∗j is an elementary embedding,
and let
E∗∗ def=
{
δ ∈ E∗ : (N, N∗j , f )  δ ≺ (N, N∗j , f ) &
the universe of each N∗δ, j , N A
∗
δ is δ
}
.
Let g : σ → λ be given by g(i) = f (aˆi ). Note that g is injective because f is an4
isomorphic embedding. By assumption (4)(i) of Theorem 2.2 [2.4], there is X = Xα ∈ P25
such that { f (aˆi ) : i ∈ X} ∈ P1 [for some Y ∈ P1 we have6
|{ f (aˆi ) : i ∈ X} ∩ Y | = κ].7
Let αX < λ be as provided by the Construction Lemma, and let8
E def= (E∗∗ \ αX ) ∩ {δ : {aˆi : i ∈ X} ⊆ δ}.9
Since we have that the universe of N is λ we have {aˆi : i < σ } ⊆ λ, so as X is a set of10
size κ < λ we can conclude that E is a club of λ. We now choose δ ∈ S such that Cδ ⊆ E ,11
so in particular Cδ ⊆ E∗ and min(Cδ) > αX .12
The Construction Lemma guarantees that there is c ∈ N such that inv{aˆi : i∈X}N¯ (c, Cδ) =13
A∗. By the Preservation Lemma we have14
inv{ f (aˆi ): i∈X}N¯∗j
( f (c), Cδ) = A∗15
[inv{ f (aˆi ): i∈X}N¯∗j ( f (c), Cδ) ∩ A
∗ includes inv{ f (aˆi ): i∈X}∩YN¯∗j
( f (c), Cδ)].16
In the case of Theorem 2.2 we have a contradiction with the choice of A∗ and we are17
done. We are almost done also in the case of Theorem 2.4, but we need to know that18
inv{ f (aˆi ): i∈X}∩YN¯∗j
( f (c), Cδ) has size κ . We know that { f (aˆi ) : i ∈ X} ∩ Y has size κ ,19
but it is a priori possible that for some i ∈ X we have invN¯∗j ( f (c), Cδ, f (aˆi )) = ∅.20
However, by Note 2.8 and the choice of E we have that invN¯ (c, Cδ, aˆi ) = ∅ for all i ,21
and then by the Preservation Lemma invN¯∗j ( f (c), Cδ, f (aˆi )) = ∅. This finishes the proof22
of Theorem 2.4.  23
Let us now pass to the promised discussion of the consistency of our assumptions. The24
following is a claim about the existence of tight club guessing sequences. If we were to25
concentrate on truly tight club guessing sequences then we could quote further results,26
for example a theorem of Shelah from [15], so in this sense Claim 2.10 is not optimal.27
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However for what we need in the main theorems tight club guessing sequences suffice; 1
hence the claim is formulated in a form that is not optimal but is sufficient, with a gain of 2
simplicity in presentation. 3
Claim 2.10. Suppose that κ < λ are regular. 4
(1) If κ+ < λ then there is a truly tight (κ, κ, λ) club guessing sequence. 5
(2) If κ = cf(µ) ≤ µ and µ+ < λ then there is a tight (µ, λ) guessing sequence. 6
Proof. (1) This is proved in [[22], 1.3(a)]. An alternative proof is to deduce the statement 7
from Claim 1.6. of [15] (for uncountable κ) by letting Pδ = {Cδ} for δ ∈ S. 8
(2) If µ++ < λ we simply find a truly tight (µ+, µ+, λ) sequence 〈Eδ : δ ∈ S〉, which 9
exists by (1), and then let Cδ be the first µ elements of Eδ . If λ = µ++, the statement is 10
proved in [[22], 1.3(b)]. Alternatively, this follows from the partial square for successors 11
of regulars proved in [[14], Section 4].  12
Remark 2.11. A problematic but natural case for (2) in Claim 2.10 would be when 13
κ = cf(µ) < µ and λ = µ+. The conclusion still “usually” holds (i.e. it holds in most 14
natural models of set theory). 15
Let us now comment on the assumptions (3) and (4) used in Theorems 2.2 and 2.4. 16
An impatient reader might have accused us at this point of unnecessary generalisation 17
and introduction of too many cardinals into the theorem, only to obscure the real issues. 18
Why not set κ = µ = σ? The reason is that in this case (2) would prevent us from 19
fulfilling (4). For example, suppose that κ<κ = κ and we are considering the requirements 20
of Theorem 2.2. We can let P of size θ def= κκ be a family of almost disjoint elements of 21
[κ]κ . Let 〈g j : j < θ〉 be some sequence enumerating all increasing enumerations of the 22
elements of P . Hence for j = j ′ the set {γ : g j (γ ) = g j ′(γ )} has size < κ . Suppose 23
that P1 and P2 exemplify that (3) and (4) hold with σ = κ , and assume also that (1) 24
and (2) hold with µ = κ . Let P2 = {Xα : α < α∗ ≤ λ}. For every j < θ there is 25
α( j) < α∗ such that {g j (i) : i ∈ Xα( j )} ∈ P1. Since |P1|, λ < θ , there is A ∈ P1 such 26
that BA
def= { j < θ : {g j (i) : i ∈ Xα( j )} = A} has size at least λ+. Since |P2| ≤ λ, there 27
is β such that 28
|{ j : α( j) = β & {g j (i) : i ∈ Xα( j )} = A}| ≥ λ+. 29
This is a contradiction to the fact that the elements of P are almost disjoint. 30
In fact the situation that is natural for us to consider is when µ is a strong limit singular, 31
because of the following Claim, which follows from the “generalised GCH” theorem of 32
Shelah proved in [17] (Theorem 0.1). 33
Claim 2.12. Suppose that θ is a strong limit singular cardinal (for example θ = ω) and 34
that κ = cf(κ) and λ satisfy θ ∈ (κ, λ]. Then for every large enough regular σ ∈ (κ, θ), 35
there are P1, P2 satisfying parts (4) of the assumptions of Theorem 2.2 and |P1|, |P2| ≤ λ. 36
Proof. By Theorem 0.1 of [17] for every large enough regular σ ∈ (κ, θ) there is a family 37
P = P(σ ) of elements of [λ]σ whose size is λ and such that any element of [λ]σ can be 38
covered by the union of < σ members of P (in the notation of [17], λ[σ ] = λ). Let us 39
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fix such a σ and let P = P(σ ). Let P2 = [σ ]κ , so since θ is a strong limit we have1
|P2| < θ ≤ λ. Let P1 be the family of all subsets of size κ of the elements of P , so2
|P1| ≤ λ · σκ ≤ λ.3
Suppose now that g : σ → λ is injective; hence the range of g is an element of [λ]σ . By4
the choice of P and the regularity of σ there is Z ∈ P such that Rang(g) ∩ Z has size σ .5
Let Y be any subset of Z of size κ , so Y ∈ P1. Letting X be such that {g(i) : i ∈ X} = Y6
we have that X ∈ P2 since g is injective. 7
Putting together Claims 2.10 and 2.12 we can see that our non-universality results apply8
in a large number of set-theoretic situations that are known to be consistent, and moreover9
follow just from the assumptions on the cardinal arithmetic:10
Corollary 2.13. Suppose that θ is a strong limit singular cardinal and that κ,µ and λ11
satisfy12
(1) cf(µ) = κ < θ ≤ µ < µ+ < λ = cf(λ),13
(2) λ < µκ .14
Then for any theory T of size < λ satisfying the oak property, we have univ(T, λ) ≥ µκ .15
Proof. The assumptions in (1) specifically say that λ > µ+. By Claim 2.10, assumption16
(1) of Theorem 2.2 is satisfied. By Claim 2.12, assumption (4) of Theorem 2.2 is satisfied17
for all large enough regular σ ∈ (κ, θ). The conclusion follows by Theorem 2.2. 18
We shall now show that a conclusion similar to the one obtained in Corollary 2.13 can19
be obtained from an assumption whose negation is not known to be consistent (i.e. for all20
we know this assumption is true just in Z FC).21
Claim 2.14. Suppose that κ and λ are regular and λ ≥ κ+ω+1. Further suppose that22
for some n, cov(λ, κ+n+1, κ+n+1, κ+n) = λ. (∗λ,κ )23
Then for any n showing that (∗λ,κ ) holds, letting σ = κ+n we have that clause (4) of the24
assumptions of Theorem 2.4 holds with some P1,P2 satisfying |P1|, |P2| ≤ λ.25
Here we use the familiar pcf notation:26
Notation 2.15. For cardinals λ ≥ µ ≥ θ ≥ σ we let cov(λ, µ, θ, σ ) be the smallest27
possible size of a familyP of elements of [λ]<µ such that every element of [λ]<θ is covered28
by the union of < σ elements of P .29
Proof. By the choice of n there is P0 ⊆ [λ]κ+n with |P0| ≤ λ and such that for every30
A ∈ [λ]κ+n there are α < κ+n and Ai ∈ P0 for i < α such that A ⊆ ∪i<α Ai . As κ is31
regular, cf([κ+n]κ ,⊆) ≤ κ+n+1. Let P2 ⊆ [σ ]κ exemplify this. For A ∈ P0 let h A be a32
one-to-one function from σ onto A, and let P1 = {h A“B : A ∈ P0, B ∈ P2}. We have33
that |P1|, |P2| ≤ λ and that P1 ⊆ [λ]κ .34
As for the clause (i) of (4), let an injective g : σ → λ be given. By the choice of P1,35
there are α < σ and Ai ∈ P0 for i < α such that Rang(g) ⊆ ∪i<α Ai . Hence for some36
i < α we have |Rang(g) ∩ Ai | = σ . Let B = {ζ < σ : h Ai (ζ ) ∈ Rang(g)}, so B ∈ [σ ]σ .37
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Hence for some B ′ ∈ P2 we have |B ∩ B ′| = κ . Let Y = h Ai “B ′, so Y ∈ P1. Now choose 1
X ∈ P2 that includes {ε < σ : g(ε) ∈ Y }, so clearly |{g(i) : i ∈ X} ∩ Y | = κ .  2
Remark 2.16. In the notation of Claim 2.14, the failure of (∗λ,κ ) is not known to be 3
consistent for any λ, κ as above. For example, consider the hypothesis (F) of [15] Section 6, 4
which states: 5
for every λ the set of singular cardinals χ < λ whose cofinality is uncountable and that 6
satisfy ppΓ (cf(χ))(χ) ≥ λ is finite, 7
and the consistency of whose negation is not known. By the “cov versus pp” theorem 8
of [12], II 5.4, we have that for every n ≥ 1, 9
cov(λ, κ+n+1, κ+n+1, κ+n) = sup{ppΓ (κ+n)(χ) : χ ∈ [κ+n+1, λ], cf(χ) = κ+n}, 10
so Hypothesis (F) implies (∗λ,κ ). One can see from the proof of Claim 2.14 that for our 11
purposes even weaker statements suffice. 12
Corollary 2.17. Suppose that 13
(1) cf(µ) = κ < µ < µ+ < λ, 14
(2) (∗λ,κ), and 15
(3) λ < UJ bdκ (µ). 16
Then for every theory T of size < λ satisfying the oak property we have univ(T, λ) ≥ 17
UJ bdκ (µ). 18
Proof. The conclusion follows by Claim 2.10, 2.14 and Theorem 2.4.  19
Let us also comment on the connection between the assumptions of Theorems 2.2 and 20
2.4. If ℵ0 < κ = cf(µ) < µ and for all θ < µ we have θκ < µ, then 21
ppJ bdκ (µ) = µκ = UJ bdκ (µ) 22
(by [12], Chapter VII, Section 1). 23
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